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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STA TE OF UTAH 
CLAUDIA HILL, by and through her 
Guardian Ad Litem, 
MARY HILL FOG EL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
VS. 
ORAND CENTRAL INCORPORAT~JD, 
a corporation 
Defendant a·nd Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
12082 
The appellant, Claudia Hill, has appealed from the 
decision of the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge, 
Recond J ndicial District Court, granting a summary 
judgment in favor of the respondent, Grand Central, Inc. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant brought the instant action against 
her former employer, the respondent, claiming defama-
tion of her characteT in the manner in which she was 
1 
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discharged from employment. The trial court granted 
judgment in favor of the respondent upon the grounds 
that the case is one of conditional privilege, that there 
is no evidence of actual malice on the part of respondent 
to remove the said privilege, that there, is no genuine 
issue of a material fact remaining to be tried, and there-
fore, respondent is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant was employed by the respondent as 
a cashier on November 6, 1969, and discharged on De-
cember 21, 1969. The appellant was presented with a 
Utah State Department of Employment Separation No-
tice indicating she was being discharged for ''miscon-
duct" because of "excessive shortages in the register in 
which she worked." (R-1) 
The separation notice was filled out by one Ellen 
Fitzpatr,ick at the request of the respondent's store 
manager, John Davis. The notice was then given to 
Frank Adams for delivery to the appellant. All of the 
aforementioned individuals were employees of the re-
spondent. (R-6-A) 
The respondent in answe,r to appellant's interroga-
tories stated that those cash registers, at which appel-
lant worked, consistently checked out short on the days 
she worked them and that such shortages were consid-
ered too frequent and too consistent to justify her fur-
ther employment. (R-6-A) 
2 
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Following her discharge, the appellant filed a com-
plaint against the respondent alleging that the separa-
tion notice was libelous on its face and had excessive 
publication. 
Tht> respondPnt filed a motion to dismiss upon the 
grnunds that appellant had failed to state a cause of 
action against the appellant upon which relief could be 
granted in that the matter was one of conditioned privi-
lege and there was no malice or the existence of any 
evidence thereof. The trial court held that inasmuch as 
the complaint did allege malice, a cause of action had 
been stated. However, the trial court questioned the 
aviwllant as to the evidence of actual malice. Upon the 
failure of appellant to show any such evidence, the court 
granted her 30 days from February 5, 1970 to produce 
some evidence, by discovery or otherwise, of actual 
malice. 
Appellant submitted one set of interrogatories dur-
ing this period of time which was promptly answered 
by the respondent. Respondent did not move for sum-
mary judgment until April 3, 1970, thereby allowing 
a1ipellant additional time to produce such evidence. No 
further discovery was utilized. 
Respondent movPd for a summary judgment on 
April 3, 1970, at which time the appellant's claimed evi-
dence of actual maliee ,,,as reviewed. The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the respondent 
111ion the grounds that the matter is one of conditional 
privilege, and there being no evidence of actual malice1 
to remove the said privilege, there is no genuine issue 
3 
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of a material fact to be tried, and respondent is, thcre-
f ore, entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FA-
VOR OF THE RESPONDENT. 
It is well established in this jurisdiction, and the 
weight of authority generally, that an employer has a 
right to protect it's interests and, in so doing, to com-
municate with and carry out protective measures through 
its own employees. In such matters an employer has a 
conditional privilege. 
In Combes vs. JJ!lontgoniery Ward & Co., 119 Ut 407, 
228 P 2d 272 (1951) this court cited with approval Harris 
vs. Garrett, 132 N.C. 172, 43 S.E. 594, for the rule that: 
... Any communication between employer and 
employee is protected by this privilege, provided 
that it is made bona fide about something in 
which (1) speaker or writer has an interest or 
duty; (2) the hearer or person addressed had a 
corresponding interest or duty; and provided ( 3) 
the statement is made in protection of that in-
terest or in the furtherance of that duty. Tlwrt> 
must be also an honest belief in the tn1th of the 
statement. Where these facts are found to exist, 
the communication is protected by law, unless 
the plaintiff can show malice on the defendant's 
part; the burden in this respect being upon the 
plaintiff. 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'l1he substance of the aforementioned rule was said to 
be statutorily recognized by Sec. 103-38-8, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943 (now 76-40-8 Utah Code Annotated 
1953) which provides that: 
A communication made to person interested in 
the communication by one who is also interested, 
or who stands in such relation to the former as 
to afford the reasonable ground for supposing 
his motive innocent, is not presumed to be mali-
cious, and is a privileged comm1mication. 
Also similar is Sec. 45-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. These two statutes deal with criminal libel and 
newspapers, respectively. 
In Knight vs. Patterson, 20 Ut. 2d 242, 436 P 2d 801 
( l 968), where one partner accused the other partner of 
('mbezzlement before a third party who had loaned the 
partnership money, this court affirmed the trial court's 
granting of a summary judgment upon the grounds that 
the statement was in the area of conditional privilege, 
and that "they were thus all involved together in a busi-
ness transaction." 
In Svielberg vs. Kuhn Brothers, et al., 39 Ut. 276, 
116 P 1027 (1911), where one businessman wrote to 
another bnsisessman accusing a mutual employee of 
"blackmail" and "selling company products and appro-
J>riating the money to his own use," the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court's verdict in favor of the 
defendant, holding that the evidence was sufficient to 
Rlio\v that the communication was qualifiedly or condi-
tionally privileged. Both businesses had 
5 
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. . . a common interest in the subject matters 
concm'lling which the communications were car-
ried on between them, and that they sustained 
such a relation toward each other in tlrn premises 
as to make it reasonably proper for one to giv(, 
to the other information concerning the conduct 
in the dealings of the plaintiff . . . 
In the' case at bar, there is no question but that 
a. conditional privilege existed in behalf of the respond-
ent to protect its property and to communicate with 
those individuals who have a common interest - in 
this case employees, to assure such protection. The re-
spondent employer had every reason to take the precau-
tionary measures it did inasmuch as there were consistent 
and excessive· shortages at those· particular cash registers 
worked by the appellant. 
The appellant contends there was excessive publi-
cation of the separation notice. However, the respondent, 
being a corporation, must deal through its employees. In 
this cas.e the manager of the respondent's store instructed 
his secretary to fill out the separation notice which was 
then given to one other employee for delivery to the 
appellant. 
In 33 Am.Jr., Libel and Slander, Section 189, we 
read: 
It is a rule recognized by many authorities that 
a privilege is not lost so long as the occasion is 
used in a reasonable manner and in the ordinary 
course of business. Applying this rule, it has been 
held that the· privilege is not lost by rraso11 of 
the passing of the defamatory matter in the usual 
course of business through the liainds of ste11or1-
6 
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raphers rt<11d clerks whether in the employ of the 
writer or of the addressee. For example, it has 
beBn held that the privilege attaching to a letter 
written to a firm on a privileged occasion con-
taining statements defamatory of a third person 
made with ont expressed malice is not lost be-
cause the writer knows that it will probably be as 
it was in fact first opened and read by a clerk .... 
(emphasis added) 
rrhe appellant contends that the acts of the respond-
ent were done wantonly and maliciously in that the 
:-:eparation notice gave "misconduct" as the reason for 
discharge. It is claimed, therefore, that the conditional 
privilege was removed. 
In Cornbes vs. 1llontgo11iery Ward & Co., supra, 
a case nearly identical to the case at bar, this court 
examined the question of malice after it had already 
Pstablished conditional privilege'. In that case, the em-
ployer's investigator questioned two employees con-
cerning certain missing money and the "honesty" of a 
third employee, Mr. Combes, who later the same day 
was fired. Combes based his complaint for slander upon 
the communication of the company's investigator with 
the other two employees. This court held there was con-
ditional privile:ge and no evidence of actual malice, and 
affirmed the trial courFs directed verdict in favor of 
the employer. In discussing malice, this court distin-
gnished between "implied malice" and "actual malice" 
eoncluding that only actual malice overcomes and de-
stroys the privilege. This court stated: 
It should be horne in mind that there is a dis-
tinction between the malice which is implied from 
7 
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every defamatory publication and the actual 
malice which is necessary to remove a conditional 
privilege, the privjleged communication being an 
exception to the nile that every such defamatory 
publication implies malice; National Standard 
Life Ins. Co. vs. Bil.lZ.ngton, Tex. Cjv. App. 89, 
S.W. 2d 491 at page 403, states a definition of 
this type of malice ,:.;hich has been used and 
approved by numerous courts: 
This kind of malice . . . which overcomes 
and destroys the privilege, is, of course, quite 
distinct from that which the law, in the first 
instance, imputes with respect to every de-
famatory charge, irrespective of rnotfre. It 
has been defined to be an indirect and wiekt>d 
motive which induces the defendant to de-
fame the plaintiff. 
Where thr condition(t1 pri1.:ilege exists, tlie defe11rl-
ant is protected wnless plaintiff pleads and proue s 
facts u·hich indicate actual malice i'n that thf utter-
ances were made from spite, ill will or hatred to-
iuard him and, unless the pla.intiff produces suc71 
evidence, there is no issue to be submitted to the 
jury. (Emphasis added) 
This court defined actual malice as that malice which 
has a "·wicked motive" and upon which utterances are 
made from "spite, ill will or hatred." 
This court in Combes, supra concluded that the 
record failed to show any evidence of actual malice and, 
in fact, the: 
... investigation was carried on in a brn.,int>ss-
like and courteous manner, without any undue no-
tice being given to it. rrhere were no outright 
accusations of theft or dishonesty, and no threat 
nor any unnecessary unpleasantness. r:Che whole 
8 
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examination into the disappearance of the money 
in that department and the suspicion as to the 
plaintiff seemed to be a bona fide inquiry about 
the facts and circumstances. It was prope1rly lim-
ited to those persons who would be closely con-
cerned with the transaction and the questions did 
not go beyond what was reasonably necessary and 
appropriate to the investigation. 
It follows that the trial court did not err in 
holding that there was no showing of malice so 
as to make a question for submission to the jury. 
In the instant case the appellant's complaint alleged 
that the information contained in the separation notice 
was not true and that by issuing said notice, discharging 
the appellant for ''misconduct,'' the respondent had act-
ed maliciously. However, the said notice explained "mis-
conduct'' as ''excessive shortages in the registers in 
which she worked." Furthermore, respondent's answers 
to interrogatories clearly show it had every reason to 
believe that the information stated on the separation 
notice was correct. The appelant has produced no evi-
dence to the contrary. 
The State of Utah requires an employer to issue a 
separation notice to each departing employee and the 
respondent, in this regard, was required to prepare the 
said separation notice honestly and accurately. As to 
respondent's choice of the word "misconduct," such is 
not evidentiary of malice. In Woolston vs. 111 ontana Free 
Press, 2 P 2d 1020 (l\Iontana 1931) where one accused 
another of being "unethical" and "underhanded" the 
court in sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's 
complaint, stated: 
9 
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It is well settled law that the words used in thP 
alleged libelious article must be susceptible of 
but one meaning to constitute libel per se ... 
Both 'unethical' and 'underhand' are words of 
such broad meaning that the,\· may or ma_\" not 
carry a libelous meaning. 
The trial court in the instant case correctly acknowl-
edged that the "words used in the separation notice are 
as capable of allegations of neglect or incompetency as 
they are of theft." 
The trial court applied the rule set out in the Combes 
case and as the pleadings failed to indicate actions by 
the respondent of actual malice it granted the appellant 
time in which to produce some such evidence. This, the 
appellant failed to do. It follows that the trial court 
did not err in holding there was no showing of actual 
malice. As stated in the Combes case, quoting with 
approval from Newell, Slander am.d Libel at page 1111: 
The ji"ry, however, will be the proper trilmnal 
to determine the question of express malice irherc 
evidence of ill will is fortlzcomin9; but if, takP11 
in connection with adniitted facts, the u·ords com-
plnined of are sitch as nmst Jun:c been 11sfd lio11-
estly mid in good faith by the defendant. the judg(', 
may withdraw the case froni a .fitry, and direct 
ct verdict for the defendant. See also "ATewell, 
Slander and Libel, 4th ed. Sec. 395. (Emphasis 
added.) 
As a result of appellant's failure or inability to 
produce such evidence of actual malice, there was no 
material issue remaining to be tried and therefore, the 
trial court did not err in granting respondent's motion 
for summary judgment. 
10 
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POINT II. 
APPELLANT \VAS GRANTED SU F FI -
CIENT TIME IN WHICH TO PRODUCE 
EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE.. 
The appellant claims she did not have adequate time 
to produce evidence of actual malice. However, the trial 
court did not require that appellant prove actual malice 
but only that she produce some evidence of actual malice 
that could form an authentic issue of a material fact. 
Upon the failure of the appellant to produce any such 
evi<lence, the trial court granted appellant thirty days 
from February 5, 1970, to produce merely some evidence 
of actual malice. The appellant served one set of inter-
rogatories upon the respondent on February 26, 1970, 
20 days after being granted 30 days time to produce. 
The respondent answered these interrogatories and 
served the same five days later. The appellant did not 
object to any part of respondent's answers, nor did 
appellant move for any order to compel answers if she 
felt the same were insufficient. 
On April 3, 1970 respondent's motion for summary 
judgment was heard and granted. Therefore, appellant 
had 56 days in which to merely show the existence of 
some evidence of actual malice. 
The trial court stated in its Bench Ruling On Mo-
tion For Summary Judgment: 
As far as I know there has been no other effort 
to take depositions or anything else. It would 
appear to the court that the plaintiff does not 
have - has been given a reasonable amount of 
11 
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time to produce evidence or show that hl' has 
some and has not done so. The action seems to 
be one of harassment. The motion to dismiss is 
granted. (R-16). 
The responsibility of an opposing party upon a mo-
tion for summary jndg1nent is well stated in Dupler vs. 
Yates, 10 Ut. 2d 251, 351 P 2d 624 (1960) wherein this 
court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary 
judgment upon the grounds that no genuine issue of 
material fact was raised. This court there stated: 
Upon a motion for summary jndgment, tlw conrts 
ought tu recognize, as a minimum, that the oppos-
ing party produce some evidentiary matter in eon-
tradiction of the movant's case or specify in an 
affidavit the reason why he cannot do so. 
Where, as in the instant case, the materials pn'-
sented by the moving party are sufficient to 
entitle him to a directed verdict and the opposing 
party fails either to offer counteraffidavits or 
other materials that raise a credible issue or to 
show that he has evidence not then ayailahle, 
summary judgment may be rendered for the mov-
ing party. 
The record made by the defendant, in support 
of his motion for summary judgment, contro-
verted the unverified allegations in the plaintiffs' 
amended complaint and therefore, in tlw ahs(•nce 
of counteraffidavits, no genuine issues of material 
fact were created. 
In the case at bar, the appellant had adequate 6me 
in which to produce some evidence of actual malice and 
upon her failure to do so the summary judgent was 
well taken and should be affirmed. 
12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Upon the failure of the appellant to produce any 
evidence to support its claim of actual malice, to remove 
the respondent's conditional privilege, no issue of any 
material fact remained and the respondent was entitled, 
therefore, to the summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that as an em-
ployer, it was conditionally privileged in its relationship 
with the appellant which privilege could be removed 
ony by actual malice on its part. The appellant was 
given every reasonable opportunity by the trial court to 
produce some evidence of actual malice but failed to 
do so. If such evidence did, indeed, exist, the same 
could have been produced by affidavit, deposition, or 
request for admissions. The appellant sought only 
answers to interrogatories which merely proved the 
honest intent of the respondent. 
The judgment of the Second District Court from 
which this cause arises must be affirmed. 
HANSON, BALH\VIN 
BRANDT & W ADS\VORTH 
REX J. HANSON 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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